ABSTRACT Device-to-device (D2D) cooperative communication is regarded as a technology which can significantly improve the spectrum efficiency and network capacity. However, the high dependence of cooperative communication on user participation makes the design of incentive mechanism become an issue of great concern. In this paper, a contract-based benefit allocation mechanism is firstly proposed to optimize the benefits of sending users and cooperative users. In such mechanism, sending user is as a contract principal and cooperative user is as a contract agent, by formulating the utility function of both contract parties, maximum benefits between them can be obtained under the control of the base station (BS). What's more, by considering the social relationships between sending users and cooperative users, user preference which describes subjective willingness with each other is further introduced in this paper. Finally, a stable matching algorithm based on the calculation of user satisfaction is proposed combining the benefits and preference of sending users and cooperative users. The simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively encourage users to participate in cooperation, thus ensures high performances in terms of utility and user satisfaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularization of mobile intelligent terminals and continuous emergence of wireless multimedia services, mobile data traffic is expected to increase exponentially [1] , which coupled with spectrum shortage and severe base station (BS) overload and leads to the unprecedented challenge to traditional cellular network. To meet the surging demand of radio spectrum resources, 3GPP proposed D2D communication under control of the cellular network, which realizes direct wireless data transmission between two devices in proximity instead of forwarding data through the BS. D2D communication can effectively improve the utilization of spectrum resources, enhance network coverage and reduce BS load [2] . Moreover, when the channel between D2D source and destination does not allow for effective direct transmission due to bad channel condition or large distance between UEs, cooperation between D2D users is an efficient way to further ameliorate transmission performance where devices can serve as relays for each other.
For example, a cooperative device can assist D2D pairs for direct data offloading, or help BS forwarding data to other D2D users [3] , [4] . D2D cooperative communication can effectively distribute multimedia data at the edge of network, thereby improving link reliability and network coverage, and fundamentally solve the problem of network resources shortage caused by large-scale concurrent multimedia data transmission.
In relay selecting of cooperative D2D communication, the social attributes and social relationships of users will cause significant design challenge. In practical network scenarios, due to the influence of various objective and subjective factors, such as device energy limitation, social privacy, and social trust, etc., users tend to be selfish and unwilling to participate in cooperation [5] - [7] . Therefore, it remains challenging to formulate effective incentive mechanism and encourage users to participate in data forwarding or content sharing. In existing methods, BS typically motivates users with rewards in the form of currency remuneration or free data based on the mastery of information [8] . However, BS usually lacks the personal information of users, such as transmission capabilities, battery levels, and evaluation of rewards, the information asymmetry between BS and users is one of the great challenges [9] . Therefore, we consider introducing contract theory into the incentive mechanism design. As a powerful modeling tool, contract theory can address the problem of information asymmetry by suitable incentive mechanism design [10] . Based on the contract theory, BS will act as an employer to offer contracts for D2D users with different transmission capacities, the contract is essentially a specific performance-reward combination, which stimulates users to participate in cooperative communication by providing corresponding rewards for them according to their performances.
In addition, in practical applications, users are often act with bounded rationality due to the complex social relationships, they not only selfishly wishing to maximize their own benefits, but also show the altruism which based on interests and friendships [11] , the contract should be designed in a combination with the analysis of subjective willingness of user. Therefore, we propose an incentive mechanism based on contract theory for D2D cooperative data forwarding, in which contracts are designed in incorporating with user preferences. Firstly, the principal-agent model was established with sending users as the contract principal and cooperative users as the contract agents. Subsequently, utility functions of both parties were calculated according to performances provided by relays and the rewards paid by BS, thereby formulating the contract optimization framework which aims at optimizing the benefits of both sides. Moreover, users' subjective preference is further introduced to describe their cooperative intention, and a stable matching problem based on user satisfaction is formulated under the contract framework, then we propose a matching algorithm to obtain the stable matching strategy that can deliver the optimal contract. Finally, for some D2D users who did not obtain high satisfaction, BS will send them contract requests again with quote raising to improve their satisfaction. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) We introduce contract theory to design incentive mechanism for D2D cooperative communication, and establish a principal-agent model between sending users and cooperative users. The formulated incentive framework based on optimal contract delivery can effectively motivate cooperative users carrying out cooperative data forwarding. 2) We propose a matching strategy with the consideration of user willingness, which can obtain the stable matching strategy for optimal contract according to mutual preferences of cooperative users and their own utilities, thus effectively improving user satisfaction. 3) We propose a re-quote mechanism to further ameliorate user satisfaction, new contract requests are resent to D2D users who do not obtain high satisfaction, thereby achieving optimal overall utility and user satisfaction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related works are introduced in Section II. The data forwarding model and utility function formulation are described in Section III. Section IV defines contract feasibility conditions and introduces the stable matching method for optimal contract delivery. Simulation results are analyzed in Section V. Lastly, the conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, some works so far have focused on the combination of D2D communication and social network characteristics [12] , [13] . Since mobile devices are carried by people, the social relationships and social structure between users will have a direct influence on D2D communication. While users share content, they may exhibit the homogeneity of common interests or similar behaviors, which can promote cooperation among them [14] , [15] . The work in [16] proposed an assisted relay selection framework based on social trust and social reciprocity, which adopt a physical-social graph to simulate the interaction between D2D users and realize the solution of alliance game according to users' social relationships. On the contrary, the selfishness of users will restrict network performance. Due to objective reasons such as caching space, equipment limitation, and energy shortage, as well as subjective reasons such as social benefit, social relationship, and privacy, users usually do not initiatively assist other users to forward data [17] - [19] . Therefore, researches on encouraging users to participate in cooperative communication have received the widespread attention.
Although incentive mechanisms for cooperative communication and specific peer-to-peer communication have been intensively investigated [20] - [22] , there are relatively few studies devoted to incentives of D2D cooperative communication. Auction method is one of the most popular incentive mechanism in related works, where spectrums are auctioned by the owners as a trading commodity, and users provide their own bidding on the basis of respective valuations, by auction, it can prompt users to disclose their true information [8] . The proposed strategy in [23] distribute data based on the auction method, by establishing a trading framework between BS and users, the data distribution is formulated as an integer programming problem, and then solved by random combination auction method. Similar to the auction method, other centralized incentive mechanisms based on trust or reputation also require frequent interaction between BS and users to obtain user information, which leads to large overhead and delay [24] . Unlike centralized mechanisms, distributed incentive mechanisms with less are overhead are more suitable for D2D communication. The author in [25] proposes an incentive scheme based on electronic token, in which the decision-making of users is simulated as a Markov decision process (MDP), and each user independently learns its optimal cooperation strategy online to maximize its long-term utility. Although the above mechanism has less overhead than centralized mechanisms, it does not take into account the information asymmetry between BS and users at the same time. In contrast, mechanisms based on contract theory can provide appropriate incentives by exploiting statistical information, so as to solve the information asymmetry commendably with low overhead [26] . Therefore, we introduce contract theory to our work, thus promote cooperative communication among users.
Existing incentive researches always assume that users are in a state of complete rationality and have absolute selfish behaviors. However, in practical network scenarios, users are often bounded rational, and show different subjective cooperation intentions which depend on the social interactions they participate in. Therefore, we propose a novel incentive mechanism combining contract theory and user preference, in which an optimal contract delivery framework is designed, then the satisfaction evaluation of D2D users and relays are fully considered to solve the stable matching problem between users. By improving user satisfaction, cooperative users can be effectively encouraged to participate in D2D cooperative communication.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cellular network with one BS, M D2D pairs and N cooperative mobile users with D2D communication capabilities, all cooperative users are regarded as alternative relays which can assist D2D pairs in forwarding data. Then we establish a principal-agent model based on contract theory, in which the D2D sending users will submit their transmission tasks to the BS as the contract principal, and the BS issue these tasks to adjacent cooperative users in the form of contracts, then cooperative users can accept appropriate contracts as the contract agent. Since the fact that cooperative users are reluctant to act as relay due to energy consumption, rewards will be offered in the contracts to encourage cooperative users to assist sending user for data forwarding.
A. DATA FORWARDING MODEL
In order to simplify the system model, the range for D2D data forwarding is limited to 2 hops, that is, a sending user can achieve cooperative communication only through one agent relay. As shown in Fig.1 , When a sending user needs to transmit data to the receiving user, it will submit the data forwarding task to the BS, then BS broadcasts the corresponding contract to cooperative users within the communication range of the sending user. Therefore, BS can send contract requests to multiple cooperative users, and cooperative user can also participate in the competition of multiple contracts.
In relay assisted cooperative transmission, the transmission rate between sending users and receiving users is closely related to the link with worse channel conditions. Since the first hop is established by sending users, its transmitting power is easier to be controlled to ensure that the data transmission rate can meet requirements. But for the second hop, the transmission power of relay will directly affect its data forwarding rate. Because sending users cannot determine the transmission power of relays, the data transmission rate of relay-assisted cooperative communication often depends on the second hop [27] . We represent D2D sending user and receiving user by u i and u j , respectively, and u k indicates one of the alternative relays. In this paper, we mainly consider Uplink (UL) scenario of cellular network, because the UL resource sharing in D2D communication only affects the BS, and BS coordination can alleviate the interference caused by D2D sending user [28] . Then, the D2D transmission rate through relay assistance is given by
in which B represents the channel bandwidth of system, p c,j and p k represents the transmission power of cellular users and relays, respectively. The channel gain of second hop links of relay transmission is h k,j , and p c,j h c,j 2 indicates the interference from cellular users to receiving users, the additive white Gauss noise is indicated by N 0 .
B. UTILITY FUNCTION FORMULATION
In contract theory, the two parties of contract will measure the benefits they can obtain from contract before signing it, and then make the decision. Therefore, we consider formulating the respective utility functions for both parties based on their benefits and costs which obtained by contract delivery. After receiving the contract broadcast by BS, cooperative users will select which contract to accept according to its own utility, meanwhile, the BS will also calculate the utility of sending users while selecting different cooperative users that participating in the contract competition, then the cooperative user which can achieve the largest utility will be selected as relay.
For the contract agents, there are capacity differences between users such as transmission performance, battery power, cache space, etc. Usually, the BS does not have this private information. To overcome the problem of information asymmetry, the BS will design several corresponding contracts for cooperative users who are expected to have specific performance based on the prior knowledge of network conditions and historical statistics. Since the contributions that users can make in cooperation depend on their transmission VOLUME 6, 2018 capabilities, all cooperative users in the network are divided into N types of collections to distinguish their expected transmission capacity, the larger the number of user type signifies the stronger transmission performance this kind of users can provide, and the performance required to provide is used as the criterion of rewards.
The contracts designed by the BS for different types of users are in the form of a performance-reward bundle combination, which can be expressed as Con = (Con 1 , Con 2 , . . . , Con N ), in which the contract designed for n-type user can be written as Con n = (T n (R n ) , R n ). Where T n is the reward that the BS pays to these type of cooperative users, and R n is the transmission rate required from them. To meet incentive compatibility, the contract should ensure that the reward T n is strictly increased with the required transmission rate R n , hence users who have provide better performance would be rewarded more and vice versa. Besides, to ensure monotonicity, the reward and required transmission rate for higher types of contracts should be strictly larger than those lower types of contracts, which is
The rewards paid by the BS can incent users to choose the best contract for themselves and reveal their private information to BS.
The transmission costs of users mainly due to the energy consumption by assisting the data forwarding. Therefore, the utility function of contract agent can be calculated according to the reward and energy consumption, it is given by
where agent u k is an n-type user, π (T n ) indicates the evaluation function of agent for the reward T n , π (T n ) > 0, and π (T n ) < 0. φ is the unit energy consumption on providing the required transmission rate. For the contract principal, the relay assisted data forwarding could lead to transmission performance improvement of D2D pairs. Simultaneously, to encourage cooperative users to cooperatively forward data, the BS will also incur a certain cost to pay them rewards. Thus, the utility function of contract principals can be calculated by the increases of transmission rate and paid reward. When selecting an n-type user u k to forward data for u i as relay, we have
where R u k ,u j is the relay transmission rate provided by the agent u k . ϕ is the lifting factor of transmission rate, which can be calculated based on the difference between the relay transmission rate R r u i ,u j and the direct transmission rate of D2D pair R d
IV. CONTRACT-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
As mentioned before, when a D2D sending user needs to forward data to receiving user, the BS will broadcasts the request to neighboring cooperative users in the form of a contract, the contract contains the data transmission rate required for relays and the corresponding reward. The cooperative user, as an agent, receives the contract request and calculates its own utility according to the reward paid by BS and the cost of performing contract, thereby decides whether to accept it or not. Subsequently, the BS will calculate the utility of the contract principal to choose an accommodative agent. Therefore, we propose a optimization framework which can solve the optimal contract delivery problem based on the formulated utility function and multiple contract constraints.
A. CONTRACT FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS
The establishment of an effective contract optimization framework must satisfy both the individual rationality (IR) condition and the Incentive Compatibility (IC) condition [29] . The IR condition is mainly to ensure that the utility of cooperative users is non-negative while signing the contract, that is, the behavior of users is rational, and users will fully consider their own utility before accepting the contract. The IC condition is primarily to ensure that users will always choose a contract that fits their user type when there are multiple available contracts. In addition, to ensure that cooperative users can meet the performance requirements of contracts, meanwhile, the constraint of channel condition also needs to be defined.
Firstly, the contract IR condition restrict that the reward obtained by an agent from a contract must compensate for its power consumption, and its utility satisfies non-negative, which can prevent some users neglecting self-interest and carrying on malignant competition. Therefore, based on the utility calculation of contract agents, the contract IR condition is defined as
Secondly, for the contract IC condition, it is mainly for the case where a contract agent has multiple available contracts, it is restricted that the agent should always prefer the contract designed for its user type. hence the contract IC condition is given by
in which T n and T m indicates the earned reward when the contract agent selects a contract which suit for n-type and mtype users, respectively. u j represent another D2D receiving user which is different from u j . Finally, for the channel conditions of D2D cooperative link, a minimum threshold γ 0 of SINR is defined to ensure that contract agents can meet the transmission quality requirement of contracts, where the threshold γ 0 can be determined according to the required transmission rate in the designed contract, the corresponding SINR constraint is given by
where γ i,k and γ k,j indicates the signal to interference plus noise ratio of cooperative users and receiving users, respectively. P c , P i and P k indicates the transmission power of cellular users, sending users and cooperative users, respectively. N 0 is the additive white Gaussian noise. α is the path loss factor, h is the fading coefficient corresponding to different links, and d is the distance between different users.
B. STABLE MATCHING ALGORITHM FOR OPTIMAL CONTRACT
Based on the definition of contract feasibility conditions, we consider finding the optimal contract which can achieve maximum user benefits by maximizing the utility of contract principals. By combining the formulated utility function and defined constraint conditions, the contract optimization is formulated as a problem of single-objective and multi-conditional constraints, it is given by
in the above optimization problem, the objective function is related to the relay transmission rate and the reward given to the relay. Since the reward offered by the BS mainly depends on the effort extent of agents in cooperative transmission, the larger forwarding power provided by the relay signifies the greater rate gain obtained by the sending user, and the more rewards will be paid. Thus, the reward that given by BS can be defined as a linear function of the relay's forwarding power, that is, T (u k ) = εp k . where ε is the reward coefficient corresponding to the forwarding power p k . Then, the utility of the principal is only related to the cooperative forwarding power of the relay, by deriving the utility function and finding the extreme point, we can find out the optimal forwarding power of contract agents that maximizes the principal's utility, thus an optimal relay achieving optimal benefits allocation can be selected according to the forwarding power submitted by agents. As mentioned before, there may be multiple agents competing for the same contract in the system model, simultaneously, the same agent may be selected as the optimal relay by multiple contracts. This competition conflict will cause contract delivery failed. Therefore, we introduce user subjective willingness to the formulation of contract optimization framework, by exploiting user preference for relay selection on the basis of matching theory, the conflict can be avoided and a matching for optimal contract delivery can be obtained. As shown in Fig. 2 , the D2D sending user and the cooperative user are defined as two node collections corresponding to the bipartite graph G, and the weights of graph can be calculated based on the utilities of both contract parties, thereby formulating a bipartite graph matching problem with weights.
To solving the bipartite graph matching problem, the utility function of contract and the subjective willingness of users for cooperation should be fully considered to obtain the maximum weight matching. Normally, the requests and interaction records of users can reflect its tendency in a certain degree, BS can define user preference based on the statistic information and feedback that users submitted. For a specific user, it usually has several preferred cooperative objects, and take different cooperative attitudes among different users. Based on the preference of users to each other, we use Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm to solve the above matching problem. The GS algorithm mainly emphasizes the matching stability and usually be used to solve the stable marriage matching between men and women [30] . Based on the specific scenario proposed in this paper, the D2D sending user and cooperative user correspond to men and women in stable marriage matching respectively, and their respective preference lists are arranged in descending order, which are defined in the Definition 1. In each round of matching, it is assumed that the principal will send their matching proposals to cooperative users in turn according to their own preference order, and the agent will select the most preferred one from received proposals and temporarily accepts it, if a better proposal appears in a subsequent round, they will accept the new proposal. For a principal, if its proposal is rejected, it will continue to send new proposals to remaining agents according to the preference order. After multiple rounds of matching, all contracts of sending users will be signed, and the two parties would reach a state of stable matching, it is shown in the Definition 2. Definition 1. If D2D sending user u i prefers u k between the cooperative users u k and u k , meanwhile, if and only if type(u k ) ≥ type(u k ) satisfied, that is, the user type of u k is greater than or equal to u k , then it is expressed as u k u i u k . similarly, if the contract agent u k shows higher preference on u i than u i and satisfies Con(u i ) ≥ Con(u i ), that is, for u k , signing contract with u i can achieve better benefits than u i , it is expressed as u i u k u i , where u k and u i are other users who are different from u k and u i .
Definition 2. The matching M is called a stable match if and only if there is no user pair blocking the matching which satisfies both u k u i u k and u i u k u i . Where u k is the current matching user of u i , and u I is the current matching user of u K .
According to above definitions of stable matching, the pseudocode of the corresponding algorithm based on GS algorithm is shown as follow. VOLUME 6, 2018
Algorithm 1 Stable Matching for Optimal Contract
Input: Given bipartite graph of contract principal and agent G = (P, A) ; The preference list of every principal and agent l P , l A 1: Set up a list of unmatched M craw = {u i , ∀u i ∈ P} 2: while M craw is not empty do 3: sending user u i send matching proposal to agent u k that locates first in his list, ∀u i ∈ M craw
4:
if u k is not matched yet then 5: u k set u i as the current hold 6: else 7: if u k more prefer u i than the current hold u i then 8: u k hold u i and rejects u i u i update its preference list l P though deleting the first agent u k in the list 14: end if 15 : end while 16: formulate a stable matching solution M according to all holds of agents Output: The principal-optimal stable matching strategy M Based on Algorithm 1, an optimal stable matching strategy for contract principals can be obtained. However, if the two parties of contract exchange roles, another optimal stable matching for contract agents will be obtained. Which means, the different propose order of sending users and cooperative users will result in different matching results [31] . Meanwhile, there are multiple feasible solutions for each request order. To find the optimal matching among all feasible stable matching solutions, and truly reflect users' willingness on cooperation, we consider converting the preference lists of users into a satisfaction function. Users will show low satisfaction while the matched object is at the bottom of its preference list, therefore, the user satisfaction must be strictly monotonously decreasing with the order of its preference list. In addition, in practical network scenarios, there is not a simple linear relationship between users' preference order and their satisfaction evaluation, thus the definition of user satisfaction is given as follow.
Definition 3: The satisfaction of D2D sending user u i with agent u k is θ (u i , u k ) = χ(rank(u i , u k )), where rank(u i , u k ) represents the order of agent u k in the preference list of u i . The satisfaction of contract agent u k with sending user u i is θ (u k , u i ) = χ (rank(u k , u i )), where rank(u k , u i ) represents the order of the sending user u i in the preference list of agent u k .
The χ(•) function in Definition 3 is a monotonic decreasing function, and 0 < χ (•) ≤ 1, where χ (1) = 1.
Generally, the psychological factors of users will impact their satisfaction obviously. While the matched object is not one of the most ideal users, users' satisfaction will descend rapidly, thereby the second derivative of satisfaction function must satisfies χ () ≥ 0. On the basis of the above analysis, the user satisfaction function of preference list order x is defined as shown below.
By defining the above function, users' expected satisfaction with matching results can be measured according to their preference list. We consider calculating the bipartite graph weights of stable matching problem through user satisfaction, then the formulated contract optimization problem can be converted to a minimum weight stable matching problem, by solving this problem, we can make the best contractual utility for as many users as possible, thus realizing the optimal contract delivery.
According to the GS algorithm, there exists at least one stable matching result for the above optimal matching problem [32] . Each D2D sending user can find a corresponding cooperative user as the relay, which can be indicated by a binary variable ρ ik , and when ρ ik is equal to 1, it represents that u i and u k are matched. Then, under the premise that the matching between two contract parties is stable, the optimal stable matching problem with user satisfaction as the objective function can be established, which is given by
in the above equation, constraint condition C1 represents that for every D2D sending user, there is one and only one agent relay matches it, and constraint condition C2 represents that there is at most one matching sending user for each agent. This is mainly because there are more cooperative users than sending users in the given scenario of this paper. This model is a typical multi-objective optimization problem, where the object of Z1 is to maximize the satisfaction of sending users, the object of Z2 is to maximize the satisfaction of cooperative users. In order to simplify the model, a linear weighted method is used to integrate the user satisfaction of both parties. For fairness consideration, the satisfaction weights of contract principal and contract agent are set to the same value. Therefore, the above multi-objective optimization problem can be transformed into a single-objective optimization problem, it is given by
While solving this single-objective optimization problem, since the constraint conditions of the optimization objective are all simple linear constraints. Therefore, the linear programming method can be used to solve this problem [33] .
C. IMPROVING SATISFACTION STRATEGY
In the previous subsection, although most D2D sending users can find a cooperative user to forward data as a relay, but some sending users still do not get satisfactory contracts due to the competition between multiple sending users in contract signing. To further improve user satisfaction, a corresponding strategy is designed in this subsection to ensure the satisfaction of the above users, thereby achieving better contract delivery. In order to improve the overall satisfaction of both parties, some users who have not yet signed an ideal contract will reapply for a new contract. Subsequently, the BS will incrementally increase the value of contract award in an iterative manner until all new contracts have been signed and the user satisfaction of both parties is no longer increased. Before the adjustment process of user matching, the threshold of user satisfaction is defined first, and sending users whose satisfaction is lower than the threshold are added in a new collection. BS can motivate more cooperative users to participate in contract competition by increasing contract awards in each round of iterations, thereby helping sending users to find a more satisfying relay. The specific iterative matching process of Algorithm 2 is as follows.
Step 1: According to the pre-set threshold of user satisfaction, D2D sending users who did not reach the satisfaction threshold are screened out and added in a collection UM P , and cooperative users who have not yet matched up are added in the collection UM A .
Step 2: BS republish contracts for users in the collection UM P , to stimulate cooperative users to accept contracts, BS will increase the rewards paid to contract agents, so as to attract more cooperative users who have not signed a contract to participate in the contract competition. When a new contract is signed, the principal u i and the agent u k will be removed from the collection UM P and UM A , respectively. Where u k and u k have the same user type, p is the increased extra reward for each iteration, and δ is the number of iterations. This step will be repeated with reward increasing until the collection UM P is empty.
The pseudocode of the specific algorithm is shown as below.
Algorithm 2 Iterative Matching for Satisfaction Improving
Input: The threshold of user satisfaction ζ and extra award p 1: Step1: Set up a collection UM P of unsatisfied sending users u i , set up a collection UM A of unmatched agent users u k 2: Step2: 3: while UM P is not empty do 4: set the new award of relay T (u k ) = T (u k ) + δ p 5: u i propose to agent user u k that locates first in its preference list 6: get maximum weight stable matching according (10) 7: 8: agent u k set u i as the current hold 9: remove u i from UM P and remove u k from UM A 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the algorithm proposed in this paper is numerically analyzed based on MATLAB simulation platform, and verified through the real data set of INFOCOM2006. The simulation is based on the model with single-cell, all D2D sending users and receiving users are randomly distributed in the cell with a radius of 500 meters, and all cooperative users in the system are also distributed randomly. In the setting of simulation parameters, the maximum communication range of D2D users is set to 50 meters, the specific simulation parameters are shown in Table 1 [34] . This paper proposes the Contract theory-based Incentive mechanism for D2D cooperative Data Forwarding (CIDF). In this mechanism, we firstly propose the Stable Matching Contract theory-based Incentive mechanism for D2D cooperative Data Forwarding(SM-CIDF). Then, in order to further improve user Satisfaction, The Satisfaction Improved Contract theory-based Incentive mechanism for D2D cooperative Data Forwarding (SI-CIDF) is also proposed. In terms of algorithm complexity, in the process of finding the optimal contract solution, this paper firstly adopts the stable matching VOLUME 6, 2018 algorithm, its time complexity is O(MN ). At the same time, the algorithm can be further reduced in complexity by constraining the user channel link and the phenomenon of some agent users abandon contract competing due to location. For the SI-CIDF algorithm, it is assumed that the number of users who are not satisfied with the current matching is q. At worstcase, there is one user can improve its satisfaction in every round of matching, then time complexity our algorithm is O(MNq). Compared with the SM-CIDF mechanism, although SI-CIDF mechanism increases the algorithm complexity due to the increasing of rematches, but gains the improvement of user satisfaction and the increase of utility.
In order to verify the effect of the proposed algorithm on system performance and incentives, two comparative mechanisms are given, they are Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction based Relay allocation Mechanism (ARM) [35] and Social Similarity-based Relay Selection (SSRS) mechanism [36] . The ARM mechanism mainly relies on the bids of users and selects relay through auction, while the SSRS mechanism mainly selects users with high preference as relays to forward data based on their social relationships. Next, the D2D user utility, data delivery ratio, and user satisfaction will be simulated. 3 shows user utility varies with the types of D2D users under different incentive mechanism. The simulation result shows that with user type increasing, the utility of SI-CIDF, SM-CIDF and ARM mechanism will increase correspondingly, and the utility of SSRS mechanism is not increasing much. This is because SSRS does not design a corresponding incentive mechanism for users' selfishness, and its selected relay is usually not willing to assist in data forwarding, thus leads to a low overall utility. On the contrary, SI-CIDF, SM-CIDF and ARM design an incentive mechanism for alternative relays in the system, and unlike the ARM mechanism which based on real-time user information collection, the proposed SI-CIDF and SM-CIDF mechanism take into account the difference of transmission capability between different types of users, and provide the contract rewards which meet the actual evaluation and demand of relays, thus achieving a more reasonable relay selection and enhancing the overall utility of D2D users. shows that with D2D pair number increasing, the utility of all incentive mechanism will increase correspondingly. For the ARM mechanisms, because the auction needs to collect a large number of user information, and the authenticity of information disclosed by the relay is difficult to guarantee, the selected relays often cannot achieve optimal gain for sending users. Besides, because SSRS mechanism only selects users with close social relations as the relay, there are few users can meet the conditions of assisted data forwarding. For the SI-CIDF and SM-CIDF mechanisms based on the contract theory proposed in this paper, more cooperative users will participate in cooperative data forwarding due to the adoption of a reasonable incentive mechanism, BS can select cooperative users with better channel conditions as relays to forward data with a higher rate, thus improving the throughput and utility of D2D users. Numerical results show that while the number of D2D pairs is 39, the utility of proposed SI-CIDF mechanism could achieve 3.4%, 8.4%, and 34.9% increasing than the SM-CIDF, ARM and SSRS mechanism respectively. Fig. 5 simulates the utility comparison of each mechanism under different cooperative user densities. When the density of cooperative users increases, that is, there will be more alternative relays for each D2D sending user, thus obtain higher throughput and utility. The simulation result shows that the proposed SI-CIDF and SM-CIDF mechanism can achieve higher overall utility than other mechanisms, this is mainly because the proposed algorithm can motivate more cooperative users to participate in relay-assisted forwarding owing to reasonable incentive design. In addition, while the density of cooperative users increase gradually, the overall utility tend to be gently increase or even decrease, this is mainly because with the increase of cooperative users, more users will participate in the contract competition, so as to raise additional computational overhead, and leads to transmission performance degradation. 6 shows the data delivery ratio of different mechanism varies with number increase of D2D pairs. Under the premise of BS coverage remains unchanged, the number increase of D2D users will cause more sending users and receiving users to be within the communication range of each other, thus improving the data delivery ratio. The proposed mechanism introduces contract theory to encourage cooperative users to participate in cooperative data forwarding, more cooperative users with good channel conditions can be selected as relays to improve data delivery ratio. However, the SSRS mechanism forwards data based on the social characteristics of users which mainly depends on the social relations between users, which leads to the limitation of data forwarding, thus affecting the delivery ratio. In addition, compared with SM-CIDF, the SI-CIDF mechanism aims at the channel conditions improvement. Therefore, the two mechanisms are relatively close in delivery ratio.
The satisfaction of users will directly reflect their willingness with cooperate, that is, if user satisfaction of both contract parties are too low, cooperative users will not be effectively motivated to participate in the contract competition, thus affecting the data forwarding efficiency. The average user satisfaction is obtained by 30 times of simulation experiments, and Fig. 6 shows the comparison of D2D user satisfaction between SI-CIDF and SM-CIDF mechanisms. In which user satisfaction is divided into three types, while user satisfaction meets the conditions 0.2 < θ ≤ 1, it is defined as strong satisfaction, while user satisfaction is satisfied 0.1 < θ ≤ 0.2, it is defined as moderate satisfaction, finally, while user satisfaction is satisfied 0 < θ ≤ 0.1, it is defined as weak satisfaction. As shown in Fig. 7 , compared with SM-CIDF mechanism, the SI-CIDF mechanism enabling users to rematch by the iterative algorithm, which can effectively improve user satisfaction, thus motivate users to participate in cooperative communication. The results showed that compared with SM-CIDF mechanism. the SI-CIDF mechanism increased 3.7 pairs of strong satisfaction type D2D users on average. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an incentive mechanism based on contract theory for D2D cooperative data forwarding, in which a principal-agent model between sending users and cooperative users is established to encourage users to participate in cooperation. To allocate the benefits between sending users and cooperative users, a optimization framework is formulated based on the calculation of user satisfaction by combining the benefits and preference of both users. In which the benefits of users are measured through the formulated utility functions, by employing stable matching strategy, the benefits of sending users and cooperative users can be optimized. Besides, the user preference with each other are introduced to describe their subjective willingness, by solving the stable matching problem with minimum weight according to calculated user satisfaction, an optimal matching between sending users and cooperative users can be found to achieve optimal contract delivery. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively motivate cooperative users to participate in cooperative data forwarding, thereby improving D2D data delivery rate, D2D pairs can obtain the significant data forwarding rate gain, thus realizes the overall utility enhancement. Our future studies include the consideration of social structure and social characteristics between users, and the analysis of users' personalized behaviors and resources requirements.
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